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There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduc-
tion of ﬁrm heterogeneity into trade models. This introduction has highlighted the
importance of the entry/exit decision of ﬁrms in response to changes in trade barriers.
However, it is typical in many of these models to use iceberg transport costs as a gen-
eral form of trade barriers that can be interchangeable with ad valorem tariﬀs. I show
that this is not always an appropriate conclusion. Speciﬁcally, I illustrate that proﬁt
for an exporter is more elastic in response to tariﬀs than iceberg transport costs, which
has implications for total product variety. One such implication is the possibility for
there to be an anti-variety eﬀect associated with lower transport costs while there also
being a pro-variety eﬀect associated with lower tariﬀs.
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11 Introduction
There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of ﬁrm
heterogeneity into trade models. Beginning with Jean (2002) and Melitz (2003), one of
the literature’s key results is that increased trade restrictions lead to increases in average
productivity for exporters and decreases in average productivity for domestic ﬁrms. These
models, among many others, have provided a signiﬁcant advancement in the literature on
intra-industry trade since its conception with Krugman (1979, 1980). This comes, in part,
from highlighting the entry and exit mechanism of ﬁrms, as this has direct ramiﬁcations for
the number (or mass) of varieties in equilibrium. Since consumers in these models show a
love of variety, this has important welfare implications; if more low productivity domestic
ﬁrms exit in response to lower trade barriers than foreign exporting ﬁrms enter, the domestic
country actually loses varieties from freer trade. This is indeed interesting since all the gains
from trade in the “New Trade Theory” stemmed purely from gains in variety.
The more recent trade theory still ﬁnds gains from trade. However, the eﬀect on product
variety has less consensus. In Melitz (2003), the eﬀect on the total mass of varieties in a
particular country is left ambiguous. Baldwin and Forslid (forthcoming) address this issue
and ﬁnd that decreased trade restrictions, in fact, have a counterintuitive anti-variety eﬀect
for the importing country. However, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) ﬁnd that decreased trade
restrictions have an pro-variety eﬀect. In all three models (as in most models dealing with
such issues), trade restrictions are modeled as the standard iceberg transportation cost.1
Although iceberg trade costs are equivalent to ad valorem tariﬀs in some settings, they are
not equivalent in the case of monopolistic competition. Therefore one cannot take the lessons
learned from the existing literature and blindly apply them to changes in tariﬀs, which is
important if one is interested in strategic trade policy.2 A key contribution of this paper is
1“Iceberg” transport costs are deﬁned as a ﬁrm needing to ship more than one unit of good in order for
one unit to arrive; the additional units “melt” away.
2Similarly, it may not be appropriate to simply “waste” tariﬀ revenue in order to model iceberg transport
costs as Jørgensen and Schro¨ oder (2008) does.
2to show iceberg transport costs aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁts and consequently the entry/exit decision
diﬀerently than ad valorem tariﬀs in a monopolistic competition setting. This has direct
implications for product variety.
To accomplish this, I provide a highly tractable model of heterogeneous ﬁrms that allows
for asymmetric changes in three types of trade barriers; iceberg transport costs, ad valorem
tariﬀs, and the additional ﬁxed cost to become an exporter. Chaney (2008) uses a model
with asymmetric iceberg transport costs and country sizes to investigate the eﬀects of the
elasticity of substitution on both the intensive and extensive margins of trade. He ﬁnds
that the elasticity of substitution always dampens the impact of iceberg transport costs on
trade ﬂows. In particular, the decreased sensitivity of the extensive margin outweighs the
increased sensitivity of the intensive margin. In addition to modeling methods, this paper
diﬀers from Chaney (2008) in other ways. First, though I focus on the extensive margin, I am
primarily concerned with the number (mass) of total varieties (both foreign and domestic),
where he focuses only on exports. Second, I’m interested in how diﬀerent trade barriers, not
speciﬁcally the elasticity of substitution, aﬀect this margin. Thus, in this regard, my paper
complements Chaney (2008) as it illustrates how the elasticity of the extensive margin is
diﬀerent depending on whether one models trade barriers as iceberg transport costs or ad
valorem tariﬀs.
In order to provide the most tractable baseline model, I make various key assumptions
that greatly ease the analysis of a situation with heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous entry.
First, I assume ﬁrms are heterogeneous across ﬁxed cost. Though the majority of these recent
models assume ﬁrms are heterogeneous across marginal cost, there is a growing literature that
assumes ﬁrms diﬀer across ﬁxed cost, e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001), Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder
(2006, 2008), and Davies and Eckel (2007).3 Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2008) provide a very
nice motivation for the use of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity. For instance, they point out that ﬁxed
3A key diﬀerence between Jøgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006, 2008) and my model is that all ﬁrms, purely
domestic and those who export, are heterogeneous across ﬁxed cost, where Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2006,
2008) only allow the ﬁxed cost to export to diﬀer.
3cost heterogeneity is more appropriate with so-called “original brand name manufacturers”
that diﬀer in the power of their brand name – a result of marketing and other ﬁxed cost
activities. Arkolakis (2008) also incorporates marketing into a model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Though ﬁrms can diﬀer in expenditures on marketing, the main source of heterogeneity
is from marginal cost in this model. This coincides well with recent empirical results that
suggest there is heterogeneity ﬁxed as well as marginal cost. For instance, Cole, Elliott, and
Virakul (2009) ﬁnd that sunk costs (which are identical to ﬁxed costs in my static model) and
ﬁrm characteristics are important factors in explaining Thai manufacturing ﬁrm’s decision
to export.4 I have chosen to use ﬁxed cost heterogeneity for three reasons: using marginal
cost heterogeneity will not change the qualitative results; marginal cost heterogeneity will
complicate the comparative statics signiﬁcantly; and there is evidence that ﬁrms do diﬀer
across ﬁxed costs.5
Second, I assume the representative consumer has Dixit-Stiglitz preferences embedded
in a quasi-linear utility function. The cost of this assumption is the income elasticity of
demand for the heterogeneous good is zero (which could be inferred as not being general
equilibrium). Despite the cost, this assumption is not entirely uncommon in the litera-
ture. Chor (2009) uses a similar technique to investigate the merits of subsidizing foreign
direct investment (FDI) in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms.6 Moreover, some models use
more general utility functions, but then make other simplifying assumptions that mitigate
income eﬀects. Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009) utilize a small country assumption
to eliminate any income feedback eﬀects. Similarly, Chaney (2008) makes a small country
assumption to ensure changes in transport and ﬁxed costs have no signiﬁcant impact on the
general equilibrium.7 In this paper, quasi-linear preferences prove useful beyond the sim-
4See also Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) who use a Melitz-type model calibrated to a French data
set, and Lawless and Whelan (2008) who explain trade ﬂows for Irish owned ﬁrms.
5The use of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity results in all ﬁrms of the same “type” (either pure domestic or
exporting) to charge the same price. This obviously aﬀects ﬁrm demand and proﬁts which in turn aﬀects
the entry and exit decision. However, this does not eliminate the diﬀerences between iceberg transport costs
and ad valorem tariﬀs as trade barriers.
6See also Becker (2009).
7Chaney (2008) points out that relaxing this assumption would reinforce his results.
4pliﬁcations they provide. My goal is to compare the diﬀerences between iceberg transport
costs and ad valorem tariﬀs. Tariﬀs generate income and though transport costs are often
assumed to be lost. Thus, tariﬀs would create an income eﬀect whereas iceberg transport
costs would not, clouding the diﬀerence I focus on. Alternatively I could model a transport
sector that generates income. I would need to take a stance on which country the transport
sector resides in as the income would aﬀect demand.8
Despite the perceived cost of these simpliﬁcations, the beneﬁt is the model’s parsimony,
which allows it to be used to investigate asymmetric changes in trade barriers. Symmetric
trade barriers seem reasonable when dealing with transport costs since the distance between
countries is the same regardless of the country of origin. Furthermore, one might expect
that diﬀerences in fueling and other miscellaneous shipping costs would be minor. However,
while symmetric changes in tariﬀs might be reasonable between members of the World Trade
Organization by rules of reciprocity, this does not necessarily apply to trade policy changes
between members and non-members. Thus, the model is useful for undertaking a detailed
analysis of changes in trade barriers, including asymmetric changes. In order to analyze
strategic trade policy, it is necessary to derive best responses, a task which requires analysis
of asymmetric tariﬀs. Though this is certainly a nice feature of the model, it is beyond the
scope of this particular paper. However, Cole and Davies (2009) use an extension of this
model to incorporate the additional option for a ﬁrm to become a multinational. They ﬁnd
that a country’s Nash tariﬀ is higher than the global optimum (which is a subsidy) and that
FDI mitigates this diﬀerence.9
Finally, in addition to the typical barriers to trade (tariﬀs and transport costs), I consider
the eﬀect of “foreign beachhead costs”, that is, those ﬁxed costs necessary to switch to engage
8It should be noted that income does change in response to changes in trade barriers and this income
change aﬀects welfare. However, it will all be through changes in consumption/production of the numeraire
and not aﬀect the heterogeneous goods sector.
9Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2008) shows that many of the qualitative results of the Melitz (2003) model
holds true with a model of ﬁxed cost heterogeneity and ad valorem tariﬀs. Given this and Cole and Davies
(2009), these aspects are omitted.
5in exporting.10 This is often a minor consideration, but with the rapid technological growth
and service industries being created to facilitate business operations, these beachhead costs
are becoming increasingly important. Friedman (2007) explains, “...UPS also has a ﬁnancing
arm – UPS Capital – that will put up the money for the transformation of your supply chain,
particularly if you are a small business and don’t have the capital...UPS is creating enabling
platforms for anyone to take his or her business global or vastly improve the eﬃciency of
his or her global supply chain” (p. 173). This has direct implications for these particular
beachhead costs and needs to be considered in conjunction with investigating changes in
other trade restrictions, as they may have conﬂicting results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes the equi-
librium. Section 3 analyzes the results including a discussion of the results under alternative
modeling assumptions including marginal cost heterogeneity. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries labeled ? and ?. Country ? (?) is endowed with ¯ ?? (¯ ??) units of
labor which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let ¯ ?? ≥ ¯ ??. There
are two sectors. Sector 1 is the numeraire and consists of a homogeneous good (?) that is
produced under constant returns to scale, freely traded, and sold in a perfectly competitive
market. Sector 2 consists of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, each variety of which is
indexed by ?. As is standard in the Melitz model, this is produced under increasing returns to
scale in a monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Unlike sector 1, this market
may face both transportation costs and tariﬀ barriers. With the exception of the diﬀering
labor endowments and (potentially) tariﬀ rates, countries are identical. Therefore, analyzing
the situation for country ? informs us of the analogous situation for country ?, and I will
refer to country ? as the domestic country to ease discussion.
10The term ‘beachhead’ costs was coined by Baldwin (1988).
62.1 Sector 1
The price of ? is normalized to 1 in each market. Assuming that one unit of labor is needed
for production, this will normalize the wage in each country to unity. Finally, I assume that
in equilibrium a positive amount of ? is produced in each country.
2.2 Consumers
The representative consumer in country ? has quasi-linear preferences with an embedded
Dixit-Stiglitz utility function which displays love for variety over the heterogeneous good;







, 𝜇 > 0 (1)
where 𝜀 = 1/(1 − 𝗼) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, ?? is the total mass of varieties in
country ?, 𝑌? denotes aggregate consumption of the numeraire, and 𝑋? can be interpreted
as the amount of a composite good comprised of the diﬀerent varieties of the heterogeneous
goods ??(?). Quasi-linear utility will isolate the decision whether to become an exporter
or not without any income feedback eﬀects; providing a model that allows for asymmetric
changes in trade restrictions (e.g. unilateral tariﬀ policy) to be easily analyzed.11 Moreover,
this speciﬁcation allows me to compare the diﬀerences between an ad valorem tariﬀ and
iceberg trade costs on productivity and variety without having to account for the income
eﬀects of the tariﬀ or the “wasteful” costs of iceberg transport costs. Finally, I assume that
income in each country is suﬃciently large that both ? and ? goods are consumed.
11Demidova and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009) use a small country assumption to eliminate the income feedback
eﬀects. However, this assumption would only be appropriate when investigating strategic trade policy
between two countries of asymmetric size. I too can allow for asymmetric country sizes in my model. This
could be done in two ways. One is by increasing the labor of one country. However, since 𝜇 is the same, the
expenditure on the heterogeneous good is still identical and this would be a trivial change. A second way
would be to have diﬀerent 𝜇s. In this scenario, one would need to be careful that the other parameters were
such to ensure a ﬁrm in country ? didn’t export to country ? without also supplying to its domestic market.





?(?)??(?)𝑑? + 𝑌? ≤ 𝐼? (2)
where 𝑝𝑐
?(?) is the price of variety ? paid by consumers and 𝐼? is aggregate income in country
?.12, 13 The solution to this problem yields a demand function for the heterogeneous good of








Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expenditure on
the heterogeneous good is equal to 𝜇 in both foreign and domestic markets.
2.3 Heterogeneous Firms
There are a continuum of ﬁrms, each of which holds a unique position on an index, where
each point ? represents a unique variety and productivity level.14, 15 Armed with this index
the ﬁrm decides whether to serve the domestic market and/or the overseas market. To serve
a given market, the ﬁrm must incur a ﬁxed cost. These costs are referred to as ‘beachhead’
costs and can be interpreted as forming a distribution and servicing network. To serve its
domestic market, a ﬁrm with index ? must hire 𝑓(?) units of labor (making the ﬁxed cost of
serving this market 𝑓(?)). If a ﬁrm chooses to serve the foreign market, it can do so through
exports and pay an extra 𝗾𝑓(?). I assume that 𝗾 > 1; 𝑓′(?) > 0 and 𝑓′′(?) ≥ 0, i.e. the
12Note that if tariﬀs are set to zero or the ﬁrm is domestic the prices, 𝑝𝑘(?) = 𝑝𝑐
𝑘(?), are equivalent.
13Recall that under perfect competition, the price of 𝑦 is equal to one.
14One interpretation of the model is that ﬁrms are owned by entrepreneurs and that ﬁrm proﬁts accrue to
these entrepreneurs. In my representative agent setting, these proﬁts would simply enter national income in
the same way that wages do, therefore I discuss the model in terms of ﬁrms to avoid needless jargon. This
interpretation is similar to that of Yu (2002).
15It is common in heterogeneous ﬁrm models to have entrepreneurs draw from a distribution of produc-
tivities (often at a cost). The advantage to that approach is that it permits multiple varieties to have the
same productivity. The cost, however, is one of added complexity and additional assumptions since modelers
are often forced to parameterize this distribution (the Pareto distribution is a common choice). Here, my
assumption of unique variety/productivity combinations aids greatly in the presentation of my results in the
simplest, most tractable fashion.
8mapping from the index to the labor required for beachhead costs is increasing and convex
in the index.16 Thus, ﬁrms requiring fewer workers to cover beachhead costs have a lower
index ?. These ﬁxed cost diﬀerences are the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity. A ﬁrm, therefore,
faces the following menu of ﬁxed costs (measured in units of labor):
Table 1: Fixed Cost Menu
Firm Type Fixed Cost
domestic only 𝑓(?)
domestic and exporter (1 + 𝗾)𝑓(?)
Goods that are exported from country ? to country ? are subject to melting-iceberg
transport costs, 𝜎 = 1 + 𝑠 ≥ 1, where a ﬁrm must ship 𝜎 units in order for one unit to
arrive at its destination. I assume that transport costs are symmetric and thus omit country
subscripts.17 I do not investigate the eﬀect of a per-unit transport cost; since marginal
costs are normalized to one, this would have the same eﬀect as iceberg transport costs.18
Additionally, an exporting ﬁrm from country ? is subject to an ad valorem tariﬀ 𝜏?, where
I deﬁne 𝑡? ≡ 1 + 𝜏?. Furthermore, I assume that a government is unable to distinguish a
particular ﬁrm’s type, so any tariﬀ is an across-the-board tariﬀ applied to all exporters. Note
that tariﬀs can diﬀer across countries.
The decision to become a ﬁrm and which market(s) to service depends on the associated
proﬁt for each type. Recall that the numeraire yields wages equal to one in both countries,
thus the operating proﬁts from serving the domestic market are
𝜋
?
𝐷(?) = 𝑝?(?)𝑞?(?) − 𝑞?(?) − 𝑓(?). (4)
16The assumption that 𝗾 > 1 is fairly standard (e.g. Melitz (2003)) and important. It is rarely seen that a
ﬁrm (particularly not a multinational) that sells abroad but not at home and as long as expenditure on the
heterogeneous good are not too diﬀerent, this ensures that will never happen. Moreover, it does so by allowing
proﬁts in both countries to be additively separable, which is quite attractive. Relaxing this assumption, but
restricting the ﬁrm to sell at home before exporting would only complicate the model without changing the
qualitative results.
17This assumption is only done for notational ease. In order to investigate asymmetric changes in transport
costs, one need only add a country subscript to 𝜎.
18This is not the case when ﬁrms diﬀer across marginal costs.
9Given the nature of monopolistic competition, the price will be a constant mark-up over
marginal cost and be equal to 1
𝗼. From market clearing, set 𝑞?(?) = ??(?), and the ﬁrm has
the following proﬁt function for supplying to the domestic market only:
𝜋
?




















is the aggregate price index of the heterogeneous
good.
The decision to become an exporter stems purely from the additional proﬁts from serving
the foreign market.19 The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate that there is an
important distinction between modeling trade restrictions as iceberg transport costs or ad
valorem tariﬀs. Consequently, I will explicitly derive the additional proﬁt function from
exports for the ﬁrm in country ? exporting to country ?. This function is:
𝜋
?
𝑋(?) = 𝑡?𝑝?(?)??(?) − 𝜏?𝑝?(?)??(?) − 𝜎??(?) − 𝗾𝑓(?). (6)
It can easily be seen by 𝑡?𝑝?(?)??(?) − 𝜏?𝑝?(?)??(?) = 𝑝?(?)??(?), that imposing a tariﬀ on the
ﬁrm is analogous to imposing it on the consumer. Recalling that 𝑝𝑐
?(?) is the price consumers













19Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expenditure on the het-
erogeneous good is equal to 𝜇 in both markets. Furthermore, recall that technologies and the mass of
entrepreneurs are also identical across countries. This, along with 𝗾 > 1, is suﬃcient to ensure that a ﬁrm
that exports will always serve the domestic market.
10Thus (6) can be written as
𝜋
?






Note that the presence of a tariﬀ is just a monotonic transformation of the proﬁt function, so
the ﬁrm’s optimal price setting rule is unaﬀected by the tariﬀ (it is still a constant markup
over marginal cost). However, the price paid by the consumer, 𝑝𝑐, is aﬀected. Therefore, the















Thus, regardless of whether one chooses to model trade restrictions as iceberg transport
costs, ad valorem tariﬀs, or some more general term encompassing them both, 𝜍 = 𝜏𝜎, the
aﬀect on the price consumers pay is the same – the restriction is completely passed through
onto them. However, the eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts are, in fact, diﬀerent and this is important
when dealing with a general equilibrium model and ﬁrm entry. To see this, input the price,















The underbraced term is the key here. Due to the monopolistic nature of the model, ﬁrms
charge a markup over marginal cost and transport costs are included in marginal cost.20
Recall 𝜎 = 1 + 𝑠. If a ﬁrm ships one unit, it loses 𝑠 units in transport, but gains 𝑠
𝗼 from it’s
20Note that, in perfect competition, price equals marginal cost and the standard result of iceberg costs
having the same eﬀect as an ad valorem tariﬀ still holds.
11ability charge a price higher than marginal cost, for a net gain (excluding demand eﬀects)
of 𝑠
𝗼𝜀 > 0. Conversely, a tariﬀ results only in decreased demand, which as seen by (10) is
identical to that of iceberg transport cost. Thus, not only are proﬁts higher with iceberg
transport costs compared to an identical ad valorem tariﬀ, but the sensitivity of proﬁts to
changes in these two diﬀerent forms of trade restrictions diﬀers as well; i.e. the variable
proﬁt will be more elastic with respect to tariﬀs than iceberg transport costs.21 Essentially,
through monopolistic power, the ﬁrm is able to recoup a portion of its losses in transport;
whereas tariﬀ revenue is completely captured by the domestic government. The markup over
marginal cost drives a wedge between the eﬀect of iceberg transport costs and an ad valorem
tariﬀ.
The eﬀect of trade restrictions on product variety is an important welfare consideration
and is determined by the extent domestic varieties enter to replace imported foreign varieties.
Since the choice of trade restrictions aﬀects the variable proﬁt elasticity and consequently the
foreign ﬁrm’s decision to enter or exit, this has implications with regard to product variety.






1−𝜀𝐵? − 𝗾𝑓(?). (12)
Again, note the diﬀerent exponents on tariﬀs (𝑡?) and transport costs (𝜎), a diﬀerence at the
heart of the diﬀering variety eﬀects.
2.3.1 Relaxing Modeling Assumptions
In this section, I brieﬂy describe the aﬀects of two speciﬁc assumptions on the generality of
results. To begin, suppose ﬁrms were additionally heterogeneous across marginal costs, 𝑎(?).
This means that ﬁrms charge a diﬀerent price,
𝑡𝑗𝜎𝑎(?)
𝗼 for an exporter.22 Additionally, let
??(p𝑐
?,𝐼?(⋅)) be the expenditure on the heterogeneous good in country ?, which a function
21This will be shown later.
22Recall equation (10).



















] − 𝗾𝑓(?) (13)
i.e. the 𝐵? term becomes more complex.
For a baseline model, I assume that 𝑎(?) = 1 for all ?, and ?? = 𝜇. It can be seen that
allowing marginal cost to diﬀer across ﬁrms will have an aﬀect on the results. However, since
the 𝑡? is raised to a diﬀerent exponent than 𝜎 in the underbraced, term diﬀerences still arise
for diﬀerent trade barriers. Furthermore, using a diﬀerent utility function will obviously
aﬀect ??(p𝑐
?,𝐼?(⋅)).23 In particular, tariﬀs generate income where iceberg transport costs
are generally assumed to be wasted. There are two points to be made with regard to this:
One, in order for tariﬀs to have the same aﬀect on exporting ﬁrm proﬁts as iceberg transport
costs, the utility function would have to result in ??(p𝑐
?,𝐼?(𝑡?,⋅)) ≡ 𝑡???(p𝑐
?,𝐼?(⋅)), which
is more restrictive than assuming quasi-linear preferences; and two, as mentioned in the
introduction, there is a transportation sector that does generate income. To be completely
rigorous, I would need to model this sector. However, it would seem to be a very special case,
in which tariﬀs and transport costs aﬀect income in the such a way to oﬀset the diﬀerences
highlighted by the underbraced term in equation (13). Therefore, the result that ad valorem
tariﬀs aﬀect exporting proﬁts diﬀerently than iceberg transport costs is not driven by my
simple baseline model.
2.4 Equilibrium
Firms will enter each market as long as there are positive proﬁts, that is, until equations (5)
and (12) are driven to zero. Thus, deﬁne the cut-oﬀ ﬁrms as the ﬁrms that draw the values
23Note though, that 𝑡𝑗 and 𝜎 aﬀect p𝑐
𝑗 in the exact same way, as shown by equation (10).
13in the index (?) that solves the following equalities:
𝐵? = 𝑓(??𝐷) (14)
𝐵?
𝗾𝑡𝜀
?𝜎𝜀−1 = 𝑓(??𝑋) (15)
𝐵? = 𝑓(??𝐷) (16)
𝐵?
𝗾𝑡𝜀
?𝜎𝜀−1 = 𝑓(??𝑋) (17)
The indices ??𝐷 and ??𝐷 represent the ﬁrms that are indiﬀerent between producing the het-
erogeneous good and not producing at all in country ? and ? respectively. The indices ??𝑋
and ??𝑋 represent the ﬁrms that are indiﬀerent between serving both the domestic and for-
eign markets and serving only the domestic market. Furthermore, the terms on the left-hand
side of the equalities represent the variable proﬁt for a particular ﬁrm and are functions of
the total mass of ﬁrms (domestic and foreign).
Figure 1 illustrates the proﬁts, with zero variable trade costs, of ﬁrms in country ?
including those who export and those who only sell domestically.24 It can be seen that the
greater the index ?, the greater the ﬁxed cost to enter a market, and thus the lower the proﬁts.
The intersection with the horizontal axis represents the index in which proﬁts are zero for
operating in that particular market. Note that the line representing export proﬁts deﬁnes
the proﬁts from exporting in addition to serving the domestic market. In other words, ﬁrms
with an index ? ∈ [0,??𝑋] make proﬁts from exporting and serving the domestic market, and
ﬁrms with an index ? ∈ (??𝑋,??𝐷] make proﬁts from only serving the domestic market. Firms
with an index ? > ??𝐷 do not produce.
After careful inspection of the equilibrium conditions, it can be seen that this is, in fact,
two systems of two equations and two unknowns: equations (14) and (17) and equations
(15) and (16).25 Moreover, due to the symmetry it is suﬃcient to only focus on one country.
I will focus on the output market in country ?, and thus equations (14) and (17). For future
24For numerical simulations, I assume that the function 𝑓(?) is linear.
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Figure 1: Proﬁts from production in country ? with free trade










3 Changes in Equilibrium
Although, I cannot explicitly solve for the cutoﬀ values without assuming a functional form
of the ﬁxed cost mapping 𝑓(?), I am still able to characterize the comparative statics. Totally












































































The term 𝗿(?) represents the elasticity of ﬁxed costs with respect to the index ?, evaluated
at ?. Equations (20) through (22) represent the eﬀect of changes in trade restrictions (either
through a tariﬀ, transport cost, or foreign beachhead cost) on the cutoﬀ ﬁrm serving the
foreign market. It follows that increases in trade restrictions decreases this cutoﬀ, or in
other words the mass of exporting ﬁrms has decreased. By decreasing the mass of exporting
ﬁrms and the foreign ﬁrms still producing now charging a higher price relative to domestic
producers, there is less competition in the domestic market. This decreased competition
makes being a domestic ﬁrm more proﬁtable, thereby increasing the mass of domestic ﬁrms
– illustrated by equations (23) through (25). The fact that increased trade restrictions,
in general, have these results is not surprising. What is important is that diﬀerent trade
restrictions correspond to diﬀerent magnitudes in ﬁrm cutoﬀ changes.
There does exist a (𝑡?,𝜎) pair that equates the comparative statics (20) with (21) and













As can be seen, the (𝑡?,𝜎) pair that equates (20) with (21) is not the same pair that equates
(23) with (24). This reinforces the fact that iceberg transport costs are not isomorphic to
ad valorem tariﬀs.
3.1 Variety Eﬀect
As just shown, diﬀerent trade barriers aﬀect the entry and exit decision by ﬁrms in diﬀerent
ways. This is important for two main reasons; the eﬀect on total variety is part of welfare
and if two or more barriers are changing at the same time, it is critical to understand
these diﬀerences to know if these changes will amplify or negate each other. Therefore,
I now investigate how each trade barrier aﬀects the equilibrium mass of varieties. The







1 + 𝗼𝗿(??𝑋) − (𝑡?𝜎)



































It can be seen from equations (28) and (29) that the eﬀect of tariﬀs and iceberg transport
costs have an ambiguous eﬀect on equilibrium total variety. The following proposition pins
down the condition that ensures a pro-variety eﬀect associated with decreases in iceberg
26Note that 𝑁𝑘 = ?𝑘𝐷 + ?𝑗𝑋.
17transport costs.27
Proposition 1. There is a pro-variety eﬀect associated with decreases in iceberg transport






Proof. Proof is by direct calculation.
This is a suﬃcient and necessary condition. A more restrictive condition for a pro-variety
eﬀect, although one that is perhaps more intuitive, is if the elasticity of 𝑓(?) with respect to
the index is nondecreasing in ?. Examples would include both linear, exponential, and power
functions of ?.
It is diﬃcult to compare the magnitudes of the variety eﬀects from changes in iceberg
transport costs and ad valorem tariﬀs because these magnitudes depend on the actual values
of 𝑡? and 𝜎.28 However, I can comment about the direction of these variety eﬀects.
Corollary 1. If
∂𝑁𝑘





∂𝜎 = 0, then
(𝑡?𝜎)
𝜀−1[1 + 𝗿(??𝐷)] = 1 + 𝗿(??𝑋).






















27Note that this is the case when ∂𝑁𝑘/∂𝜎 < 0.
28For purposes of comparison, one logical choice would be to evaluate the comparative statics when the


























18It is straightforward that
∂𝑁𝑘
∂𝜎 < 0 ⇒
∂𝑁𝑘
∂𝑡𝑘 < 0.
It is obvious that the contrapositive to Corollary 1 is also true, that is
∂𝑁𝑘
∂𝑡𝑘 ≥ 0 ⇒
∂𝑁𝑘
∂𝜎 > 0.
The fact that trade restrictions can have an ambiguous eﬀect on total product variety in a
country is not surprising or new. What is surprising and new is that it is possible for there
to be an anti-variety eﬀect associated with lower transport costs while there also being a pro-
variety eﬀect associated with lower tariﬀs. Thus, under certain speciﬁcations a reduction in
both trade barriers could lead to no change in total product variety. Again, these diﬀerences
are driven by how iceberg transport costs aﬀect proﬁt diﬀerently than an ad valorem tariﬀ.
Changes in a ﬁrm’s variable proﬁt (𝑣𝜋) is the reason for entry and exit and the variable

















This, in turn, aﬀects the elasticity of the ﬁrm cutoﬀs – the cutoﬀs for an exporting and a
purely domestic ﬁrm are more elastic in response to a change in an ad valorem tariﬀ than
iceberg transport costs. Turning now to the elasticity of total variety, ??, which I deﬁne as





1 + 𝗼𝗿(??𝑋) − (𝑡?𝜎)













Comparing the two elasticities yields:











One has to be careful in interpreting this result given the results of Corollary 1. If there
19is a pro-variety eﬀect associated with a decrease in iceberg transport costs, then the total
product variety is more elastic (but is negative) with respect to tariﬀs. If there is an anti-
variety eﬀect associated with a decrease in ad valorem tariﬀs, then the total product variety
is less elastic (but is positive) with respect to tariﬀs. Finally, there are scenarios in which the
two trade barriers have opposite eﬀects on variety resulting in ambiguity as to the relative
elasticities.
4 Conclusion
It is common in the recent trade literature to simply assume iceberg transport costs as a
general proxy for many types of trade restrictions (in particular ad valorem tariﬀs). When
perfect competition is assumed the two trade barriers are analogous. However, in the often
used model of monopolistic competition, this is no longer the case. I have provided a simple
model of trade with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous ﬁrms that illustrates how
changes in iceberg transport costs aﬀect proﬁt diﬀerently then ad valorem tariﬀs. This, in
turn, aﬀects the elasticity of entry and exit diﬀerently. Since the equilibrium number of total
varieties is determined by how many new foreign varieties replace exiting domestic varieties
or vice versa (depending on the direction the trade barriers are going), this elasticity of
entry and exit matters. Furthermore, I have shown that although iceberg transport costs
and ad valorem tariﬀs have an ambiguous eﬀect on total variety, they do not necessary have
the same eﬀect; i.e. it is possible for there to be an anti-variety eﬀect associated with lower
transport costs while there also being a pro-variety eﬀect associated with lower tariﬀs. Thus,
there are consequences in how one chooses to model trade restrictions. The severity of these
consequences depends on the particular research question, but the consequences are there
nonetheless.
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